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Abstract: Talk of fake news is rife in contemporary politics, but what is fake news, 
and how, if anything, does it differ from news which is fake? I argue that in order to 
make sense of the phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to first define it and then 
show what does and does not fall under the rubric of ‘fake news’. I then go on to 
argue that fake news is not a new problem. Rather, if there is problem with fake 
news it is its centrality in contemporary public debate. 
 
According to the news and the proclamations of world leaders, apparently 
there is a lot of fake news out there. In order to make sense of the seemingly modern 
phenomenon of fake news, it is necessary to define what fake news and what fake 
news is not. Once we are clear what falls under the rubric of ‘fake news’ it becomes 
clear that fake news is not itself a new problem. Rather, the issue that makes fake 
news both interesting and challenging is its newfound centrality in public discourse. 
Fake news challenges our conception of what the ‘news’ is, which in turn leads to 
issues as to how we appraise the sincerity and intent of those who disseminate it. 
When talking about how to analyse any phenomena, it is helpful to get clear 
about what it is we are talking about. Fake news is, at least when it comes to the kind 
of thing world leaders like U.S. President Donald J. Trump talk about, a new 
phenomenon. As such, what is thing called ‘fake news?’ 
M R. X. Dentith has defined ‘fake news’ as: 
 
[An] allegation that some story is misleading—it contains significant omissions—or 
even false—it is a lie—designed to deceive its intended audience. (“The Problem of 
Fake News” 66) 
 
That is, fake news is a misleading story which is intended to deceive some 
target audience. 
In a paper published about the same time, Neil Levy also advanced a 
definition of fake news, writing: 
 
Fake news is the presentation of false claims that purport to be about the world in a 
format and with a content that resembles the format and content of legitimate media 
organisations. (Levy) 
 
Levy adds in the necessary caveat that fake news has the form and 
presentation of actual news. That is, fake news gets its rhetorical force by 
successfully aping the (typically taken to be not-fake) news. Fake news is a problem 
precisely because it resembles the news but is not just misleading, but misleading by 
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design. Of course, if we say something is misleading, we have to ask "misleading to 
who?" because the kind of intentional deception we are talking about with respect to 
fake news is targeted towards some specific audience. 
However, Levy also includes under the rubric of ‘fake news’ news sources 
which reproduce information without checking it first. But to produce fake news 
surely requires more than just a lax attitude towards the truth: it requires some kind 
of intentional deception. Whilst lazy journalism is certainly a problem, it is not what 
we should call ‘fake news’ because fake news intends to mislead, rather than 
misleads due to accident or laziness. 
Axel Gelfert defines fake news as: 
 
[B]est defined as the deliberate presentation of (typically) false or misleading claims 
as news, where the claims are misleading by design. (85–6) 
 
Gelfert’s definition is similar to Dentith’s, but with Levy’s caveat that fake 
news is presented as news. Like Dentith, Gelfert takes it that fake news can be false 
or just misleading. That is, fake news can contain some truths. As Gelfert notes: 
 
[M]uch of the initial credibility of fake news derives from real-world back-stories, 
and almost all fake news purports to be about real-world actors and entities. (100) 
 
That is, fake news need not be entirely fictional. Rather, it simply must 
mislead in a non-accidental way1 to a target audience by virtue of passing as news. 
That latter point is important; Gelfert considers the case of satirical stories 
being taken seriously. In these cases the audience is not really mislead because they 
understand the intent of the satire. For a story to be fake news, then, the audience 
must think some piece of fake news is actually news, which raises the question of 
how purveyors of fake news might mislead their audiences. After all, given that fake 
news can be merely misleading, rather than an outright fabrication, we can ask 
whether fake news could ever be made up of entirely true statements? 
We can think of stories (whether news or not news) existing on a spectrum 
from the false (low-to-no resemblance to the world) to the factual (high-to-complete 
resemblance to the world). 
 Fake news, we might think, sits typically somewhere towards the low 
resemblance part of the spectrum, but some stories which are entirely true (or, at 
least, have very high resemblance with the world) will turn out to fall under the 
domain of ‘fake news’ because, nonetheless, they are misleading by design. 
For example, the leader of New Zealand’s National Party, Simon Bridges, in 
early 2018 issued a press release in which he claimed that the Ministry of Justice had 
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news article suddenly rendering the whole article as fake news, a caveat Levy fails to 
consider. 
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provided him with data which showed that the country’s Three Strikes Law (which 
mandated maximum sentences for convicted criminals on their third strike offence) 
was working to reduce reoffending. However, he failed to reveal that there were 
caveats attached to that data: the statistics could not be used to prove the 
effectiveness of the law because, according to the Ministry of Justice, there were a 
variety of other factors which could equally or more likely explain the downward 
trend of criminal offences in New Zealand since the law came into effect.2 
Now, Bridges did not fabricate or alter any information; what he said, 
however, was misleading due to the selective way in which he presented some but 
not all of the data the Ministry of Justice had provided. As such, we can ask just how 
selective or deceptive his story was. That is, was his press release misleading-by-
design? But we also have to ask, was it even news? 
 
Fake news as news 
 
Misleading a target audience by design is not fake news (even if it is still 
problematic) if it is not presented as news. That is, on any standard account of the 
news, news stories should be considered separate from things like press releases and 
the like. We expect (or, at least, we might have used to expect, as I will argue later 
on) that the news is a report stemming from some journalistic investigation. 
However, the modern news cycle (and the economics of the news in the online era), 
has seen press releases either published as news, or only lighted edited before 
appearing as a news story. That is, part-and-parcel of the problem of fake news is 
not just that fake news happens to be stories presented as news which are misleading 
by design to some target audience, but also because what counts as ‘news’ is 
increasingly blurred.3 
We could get around this problem by talking about fake news and the news 
less with the institutional frame that news stories are produced by the members of 
the Third Estate/the Media, and refocus our interest on stories which are considered 
‘newsworthy’. As such, claims by, say, prominent business people and political 
leaders are newsworthy, and thus could be considered as examples of fake news if 
they turn out to be misleading by design to some target audience. 
However, this pivoting of the definition to concern the newsworthy, as 
opposed to stories presented as news which are misleading by design, is problematic. 
Let us assume for the moment that Simon Bridges knew he was misleading his target 
audience (voters): that is, he misled by design. The fact that his misleading statement 
about the Three Strikes Law was reported by news outlets uncritically surely is the 
problem here? We expect politicians to campaign on issues which are important to 
them, and we should also expect that politicians will present things in the best 
possible light for their party. Bridge’s National Party enacted the Three Strikes Law, 
                                                     
2 The Ministry of Justice said that changes in policing, not prosecuting certain minor 
offences, a greater focus on rehabilitation of criminals, etc., could just as easily explain the 
downward trend in criminal offences. 
3 The same argument can be run for the blurring of the lines between advertisements and the 
news, as exemplified by things such as ‘advertorials’. 
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and thus, under threat of it being repealed by a new government, made a case for 
keeping it (even if said case used data which did not necessarily support keeping the 
law). Bridge’s statements were newsworthy, but it only became news when it was 
reported. 
This issue is compounded by the prevalence of opinion pieces in the media. 
An opinion piece is typically targeted to a certain audience with the producer of that 
piece often using rhetoric not to persuade their audience to change their minds but, 
rather, to reassure them that what they already believe is right. Not just that, but 
opinion pieces are not typically held to the same journalist standards as other pieces 
produced by the same news outlet; sometimes, to assuage some target audience, 
selective evidence is use or fact-checking is skipped. That is, opinion pieces may 
often be misleading, and perhaps intentionally so, but the target audience are—in 
some sense—willing victims rather than targets of deception. 
This is all to say that fake news gets its potency by being a deliberately 
misleading news story. As such, whilst people like Simon Bridges can try (in this 
example) to get news outlets to present his party’s side of the story, our expectation 
should be that the various news outlets should check and verify his claims before 
reporting it as news. Indeed, in this case most of the reporting over Bridge’s claims 
did include reporting of the various caveats that the Ministry of Justice provided. 
That is, whilst Bridges might have tried to mislead the public, the media, by-and-
large, did not. 
If there is a problem with fake news, it is an issue which centres on the 
presentation of information by news outlets as news. As such, we should be careful 
to ensure that when we talk about fake news we are talking about news which is 
fake, rather than stories told by politicians or other influential individuals.4 
 
Alleging that something is fake news 
 
Whilst stories told by politicians and other individuals might not be fake 
news we should linger on their speech a little longer. Part-and-parcel of the 
purported problem of fake news is that we have to distinguish between news which 
is actually fake, and news which is alleged to be fake: the latter being the rhetorical 
frame of ‘That’s just fake news!’ From Donald J. Trump’s proclamations that his 
many opponents are generating fake news about his presidency, to people like 
Russian Federation Vladimir Putin, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, 
President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdogan, as well as the leaders of the various, 
Brexit campaigns in the U.K. and the like, allegations of fake news by the powerful 
are rife. 
                                                     
4 A response to this is to say that we are being too restrictive here as to what counts as both 
the ‘news’ and a ‘news outlet’, in that why should we restrict the production of the news to 
the Third Estate (especially in the modern age where citizen journalism is a valuable tool in 
getting news out into the marketplace of ideas). There is something to this kind of response, 
but for the purposes of this discussion we will restrict talk of the news to that which is 
produced by the institutions associated with the production of the news because—for the 
most part—such a reduction in scope allows us to more ably diagnose what the problem of 
fake news might be. 
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However, alleging something is ‘fake news’ does not tell us that it is news 
which is fake. People, after all, dismiss the claims of others as spurious all the time, 
sometimes engaging themselves in specious reasoning. We need to be careful to 
distinguish between proclamations of ‘That’s just fake news’ and ‘fake news’. It is 
possible to live in a world where all allegations of fake news are themselves fake, 
and all news is authentic, or a world in which fake news is a problem but no one 
ever alleges fake news is abounding. The existence of one does not entail the other. 
As has been argued elsewhere, such labelling practices like ‘That’s just fake news’ 
are common, for example, when dismissing claims about the existences of 
conspiracies: labelling something as a ‘conspiracy theory’ often is a good way to end 
a debate and portray someone’s views as irrational.5 However, for the claim ‘That’s 
just fake news!’ to have any weight the person making the allegation must have 
some authority or institutional status. After all, the allegation some claim about 
yourself, or your activities is ‘fake news’ will only be persuasive to a target audience 
if the person (or organisation) making the allegation can claim (sincerely or not) 
some authority on the matter. 
This is not to say that, for example, everyday individuals cannot allege 
‘That’s fake news!’ It is simply the recognition that there is a particular kind of 
rhetorical force about allegations of fake news which are special to people in 
positions of power. Your partner claiming reports you have heard that they are 
having an affair is just ‘fake news’ seem different in kind from your Prime Minister 
or President making a similar claim. 
 
Intentions and intentionality 
 
What the allegation ‘That’s just fake news!’ and fake news share is the 
concern that audiences are being misled by design. That is to say, the producers of 
fake news intend to mislead. 
For example, on the morning of February the 17th, 1873, the readers of the 
New Zealand-based newspaper “The Daily Southern Cross” were surprised to read a 
story about a Russian warship having seized the Port of Auckland (Luckie 3). The 
story was fake: upon closer inspection the Russian Ironclad was named the 
‘Kaskowiski’ (‘cask of whisky’), the ‘report’ appeared on page three rather than the 
front page, and the purported enemy invasion had occurred three months earlier 
(something the story drew attention to by placing an asterisk beside the date of the 
tale). Yet we have some clear indicators as to why paper’s editor, David Luckie, 
wrote (or printed) the story: he was drawing attention the lack of promised British 
warships in the region.6 The Kaskowiski story was misleading (given it was a hoax) 
but not fake news: the editor’s intent was to stimulate debate rather than persuade 
the paper’s audience that the Russians were coming (or, in this case, been). 
                                                     
5 See Conspiracy theories and the people who believe them (Dentith, “Conspiracy Theories 
and Philosophy - Bringing the Epistemology of a Freighted Term into the Social Sciences”) 
for coverage and criticism of this labelling practice. 
6 New Zealand was still a British colony at the time. 
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Yet working out the intentions of the producers of misleading news is not 
obvious in all such cases. Take, for example, “The Journal of American Physicians 
and Surgeons” a publication of the Association of American Physicians and 
Surgeons. Founded in 1943 to fight ‘socialised medicine’ in the U.S., the journal 
publishes discredited medical hypotheses like the denial of the link between HIV 
virus and AIDS, the link between the MMR vaccine schedule and autism, and the 
link between abortions and the development of breast cancer. That is, it peddles 
news which is fake. But are the editors of “The Journal of American Physicians and 
Surgeons” acting insincerely and thus trying to mislead their audience? Or do they 
sincerely believe the research they publish? After all, they claim their journal 
adheres to academic standards. As such, it might be tempting to think that this is an 
example of what Richard Feldman calls ‘reasonable disagreement’, a case where 
epistemic peers (epistemic agents roughly equal to each other with respect to 
intelligence, reasoning ability, and who also happen to be privy to the same 
background information) to reasonable agree to disagree with one another (Feldman, 
“Epistemological Puzzles About Disagreement”; Feldman, “Reasonable Religious 
Disagreements”). 
Reasonable disagreement requires that epistemic peers engage in full 
disclosure with one another. Full disclosure is a state where epistemic peers are able 
to express fully to one another their reasons for believing some claim. If they can do 
this and they still disagree with one another, then their disagreement can be 
considered reasonable. But in the debate about fake news it is hard to think there can 
be any reasonable disagreement. “The Journal of American Physicians and 
Surgeons” does not claim that they are presenting merely an alternative view. 
Rather, they claim to be combatting a liberal conspiracy in the medical community 
against the kinds of views their conservative members think are the best results of 
medical research. 
Now, the idea that elements in the medical fraternity engage in conspiracies 
and cover-ups has a long and storied history. From the ‘Tuskegee Study of Untreated 
Syphilis in the Negro Male’ (AKA the ‘Tuskegee Syphilis Study’) in the middle of 
the 20th Century, to current issues to do with the non-publication of null results in 
pharmacological research trials, we know that cover up and conspiracies have 
occurred. However, even if we grant that there are (some) grounds to thinking 
medical conspiracies might still be occurring now, this does not automatically give 
us reason to suspect that the specific liberal bias and cover-ups espoused by the 
editors and contributors of “The Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons” is 
warranted. 
Indeed, we might even go so far to suspect that the editors and contributors 
to “The Journal of American Physicians and Surgeons” are being insincere, trading 
upon the notion of being epistemic peers in order to muddy the waters of medical 
research. This is important because—as previously noted—our operating definition 
of what counts as fake news has that it is misleading by design. That means if we 
accuse the editors or contributors to “The Journal of American Physicians and 
Surgeons” of producing fake news, we are making some claim about their intentions 
(notably that they trying to deceive their audience). 
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Talk of intentions here is important, then, for how we parse discussion of 
what fake news and is not. Fake news exists somewhere not on a one axis graph, but, 
rather somewhere on a two axes one which takes into account both resemblance and 
intentionality. 
 Fake news occupies space somewhere in the lower two quads; it can be be 
made up of entirely fictitious statements or factual statements as long as the intent is 
to mislead some target audience. Testing how well a purported news story resembles 
what actually happened (in an ideal media landscape) should be relatively easy, 
given that we can refer to other sources and the like. Arguing that information was 
selectively used or fake information planted into the story intentionally (i.e. by 
design) is a much harder task however. That is, a news story which includes 
fabrications leads to obvious questions as to how such fabrications were allowed to 
go to print. However, in the case of selectively-omitted information it is harder to 
infer intentional deception because it is always possible that the reporter did not 
think the omitted information was salient. But this still requires us to talk about the 
intentions of the people purveying (purported) fake news. 
However, given that intentions can be tricky to measure at the best of times, 
it is useful to look at the target audience of the news. After all, perhaps the target of 
the news will help us infer the intentions or sincerity of the news provider? 
 
Target audiences 
 
Fake news is not just misleading by design: it is aimed or targeted at a 
certain audience. Sometimes we can infer that audience with respect to the general 
audience of the media or news outlet which produces it. For example, “The 
Guardian,” a U.K.-based newspaper targets urban liberals, whilst another U.K. 
newspaper, “The Daily Mail” targets conservatives. In some cases we can also infer 
the target audience of a news outlet by the kind of stories they regularly produce. 
“The New Zealand Herald” is the country’s single major newspaper and, although 
30
University of Bucharest Review    Vol. VIII/2018, no. 1 (new	series) 
Truth(s)	and	Alternative	Facts	
 
ostensibly it targets the country as a whole, tends to feature news stories which 
appeal to members of the Boomer generation7. 
However, working out who the target of some piece of fake news is can be 
tricky. Take, for example, Nigerian 911 email scams. According to Cormac Herley 
at Microsoft Research, Nigerian 911 scams are deliberately filled with typos and 
inaccuracies in order to reduce the number of critical respondents, and thus increase 
the chances that someone credulous will eventually wire the scammer money in 
order to secure their fortune (Herley). As such, the target audience of a Nigerian 
scam email is not everyone in the recipient list. Rather, it is the kind of people who 
gloss over and ignore the obvious errors in the emails they receive. 
The same is presumably true of fake news: not everyone in a certain 
demographic is presumably the target of some piece of fake news. Rather, it all 
depends on the nature of the fake news itself. Fake news which is merely selective in 
its evidence use, and contains no (or very few) fabrications, may have a broader 
target audience than fake news which includes deliberate falsehoods which will only 
be believed (or glossed over) by certain people. But, once again, to be able to make 
claims about the target audience, we have to rely on claims about the intentions of 
the producer of said news, because otherwise we might well be talking about the 
target audience of sloppy reporting. 
None of this is to say that we should resile from talk of fake news, nor seek 
to find a way to measure it and its prevalence. Rather, what this paper seeks to do is 
speak to a fundamental problem with talk of fake news: our definition of what 
counts as ‘fake news’ requires that we say something about the intentions of the 
producers of fake news, and who that fake news is meant to mislead. That is, we 
have to say something about how some piece of news is intentionally misleading (as 
opposed to simply not fact-checked, or the result of lazy journalism), as well as who 
the target audience of that piece of news was. 
 
The apparent centrality of fake news today 
 
Most ordinary reasoners think of the production of news as, if not a strictly 
veristic activity, the most plausible and justified account of some event. While we 
know breaking news might sometimes get misreported (and thus revised later), and 
some events might be misreported and never adequately corrected (because the 
event was so minor), we tend to expect journalists to be sincerely in their reporting. 
However media coverage is, and has been, partisan. That is, the news is not 
always the cliche of ‘Just the facts!’ Indeed, the idea the news is a factual endeavour 
might also be a modern invention. Newspapers have often reported fake news 
alongside real news, often with little to distinguish the two types of story (if, indeed, 
there was a real distinction to be made). “The Illustrated Police News,” for example, 
was a Victorian-era tabloid which published sensational and sensationalised stories 
about (then) contemporary and historic crimes). Some of its stories were edited for 
dramatic effect, whilst others were largely fabricated. That is, it was a publication 
(one of many at the time) which peddled in what we would now label ‘fake news’. 
                                                     
7 Those born just after the close of World War II. 
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However, readers of that bulletin were aware that many of its stories were 
sensationalised or fabricated. Thus while some of its contents were fake, the target 
audience was aware of that fact. Indeed, late 19th Century/early 20th Century 
newspapers (like “The Daily Southern Cross”) sometimes carried what we might 
deem fake news now, but trusted that readers would be attentive to it. 
It is, then, plausible to think that people might have been more attentive to 
the problems of fake news in the past because news which was fake (but not actually 
fake news: the stories had a target audience who knew the ‘reporting’ that they were 
reading was fabricated) was part-and-parcel of their lives. If this supposition is 
correct, and news which is fake has been with us for a while, this raises the question 
of whether news which is fake is a bigger issue now than it has been in the past? 
After all, what we currently call ‘fake news’ is a subset of the larger category of 
‘news which is fake’. New which happens to be fake contains within it the subset of 
news which is fake which is nonetheless believed. 
Now, this question about the seeming issue of news which is fake now is 
ambiguous, because it has two possible meanings. Is news which is fake a bigger 
issue today because there is more news which is fake now than in the past, or is it a 
bigger issue regardless of the incidence level because of the prevalence of news 
which is fake and the allegation ‘That’s just fake news!’ in contemporary discourse? 
It is easy to think there is more news which is fake now than there has been 
in the past because allegations about fake news are currently rife in political 
discourse. However, the seeming increase in the labelling of stories as ‘fake news’ 
does not tell us that there is more news which is fake. At best it tells us we are more 
attentive to the problem of such fake news, and at worst it tells us that politicians 
and influential institutions are weaponising the label ‘fake news’. 
Now, we could refer to survey data: there has been, over the last few 
decades at least, studies into the news media, the reliability of news reports, the 
trustworthiness of certain kinds of authorities, and the like. This would give us some 
insight into public attitudes and expectations of the news over time. The problem, 
however, might be if people were more attentive to the issues of news which is fake 
at earlier points in history, our survey results now might be measured against what 
was a different standard then. 
As such, if there is a problem with now then we are better off arguing that it 
is because of fake news apparent centrality to contemporary public debate. Even if it 
is not a new problem, it is a current problem. After all, no matter the answer to the 
first question, the second question—how central is fake news in contemporary 
discourse—is the most interesting. It allows us to talk about trust, reliability, and the 
intentions of those in the media. Fake news, alternative facts and misinformation 
were, for example, all part of the story certain Western powers tried to sell about 
Weapons of Mass Destruction in Iraq back in 2003, the basis and need for a Cold 
War after World War II, and the like. What might be new, however, is the centrality 
of claims ‘That’s just fake news!’ in our political discourse. 
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Conclusion 
 
Once we do the conceptual work about what fake news is, and how 
allegations of ‘That’s just fake news!’ get their rhetorical power, we end up getting 
back to issues of trust and reliability of sources, two staples of talk in epistemology 
which relate to the tricky issue of appraising the intentions of the producers of 
information. 
So, what can we say about fake news? It is information which presents itself 
as news, and thus we can rule out political speech which may well be newsworthy 
but is not itself a product of news producers (nor should be confused as the product 
of a news outlet). Fake news is also targeted towards some audience, and thus some 
cases of news which is fake but is known to be fake by its target audience will prove 
not to be fake news (i.e. satire). As such, a lot rests on the intentions of the producers 
of fake news to mislead said audience, and thus anyone willing to defend their fake 
news can always say ‘Sorry; that was just sloppy journalism on my part.’ 
But perhaps more importantly, what comes out of this analysis is that we do 
not really need the term ‘fake news’ to analyse the contemporary phenomena of 
news which is fake. That is, in the end ‘fake news’ is not new. What we label as 
‘fake news’, and what we take to be problematic about fake news is, however, 
interesting. This is because claims about fake news happen to have a certain 
centrality in public debate at this time. Yet we should not mistake the fact that the 
claim ‘That’s just fake news!’ has been weaponised by certain leaders as designating 
a new problem. We are dealing, as always, with questions about how we judge the 
reliability and trustworthiness of sources in public discourse, and whether those 
sources are acting sincerely or insincerely with their endorsements of particular 
claims. As such, what is fake about fake news is fake news itself. Conversely, what 
is also interesting about fake news is its current prominence. Even if fake news is not 
new, it is fertile ground for epistemology which shows that what we study is 
important. 
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